Risky Research Review Act

The bill would establish the Life Sciences Research Security Board as a new independent executive-branch agency with authority to review proposed federal funding for "high-risk life sciences research" — defined to include gain-of-function experiments and dual-use research of concern involving high-consequence pathogens such as Ebola, influenza A, SARS- and MERS-related coronaviruses, Marburg virus, and others. The Board's approval determinations would be binding on all federal agencies. Entities seeking federal grants or contracts would have to attest under penalty of perjury whether their proposed research is high-risk; agencies would certify those attestations and could not award funding without Board approval. The Board would complete standard reviews within 120 days and emergency reviews within 15 days. It could also retroactively review and suspend pre-enactment federally funded research it deems high-risk.

The bill would not regulate privately funded research and would not apply to research that does not involve federal money. The Board's nine presidentially appointed members — including a Senate-confirmed Executive Director, five life scientists, two national security experts, and one biosafety expert — would be subject to strict conflict-of-interest screening and security clearance requirements. The Government Accountability Office would periodically audit the Board, and the Board would report annually to Congress.

Universities, research institutes, private companies, and foreign entities that apply for or receive federal grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements to conduct life sciences research involving high-consequence pathogens or gain-of-function experiments. All federal agencies that fund such research — including NIH components, the Defense Department, and others — would be legally bound by Board determinations. Federal employees who fail to certify applicant attestations properly would face disciplinary action and permanent security clearance revocation.

If enacted, no federal agency could fund gain-of-function or dual-use dangerous-pathogen research without pre-approval from a security-cleared, independent board — a layer of mandatory oversight that does not currently exist in statute. Researchers whose proposals the Board rejects would lose access to federal funding entirely, and applicants who falsely attest their work is not high-risk would face suspension and debarment from all future federal awards.

The President would appoint Board members within 30–45 days of enactment; the Board would publish review procedures within 180 days of those appointments and begin operational reviews 270 days after enactment. Each funding agency would establish its own internal process — in consultation with the Board — for identifying high-risk proposals, certify applicant attestations, and notify the Board at least 30 days before any planned life sciences award. The Board would complete standard reviews in up to 120 days and emergency reviews in 15 days, publishing approved biosafety and biosecurity control requirements. Agencies must post their prepayment and pre-award procedures online. The GAO would audit the Board periodically, and the Board would brief Congress quarterly and report annually.