Stop Chinese Fentanyl Act of 2025
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Would expand the class of Chinese entities and government officials subject to mandatory U.S. sanctions for opioid trafficking, and would require the President to conduct cost-benefit analyses before issuing economic regulations under emergency trade authority during a declared drug trafficking national emergency.
The bill addresses two distinct policy levers: closing gaps in existing fentanyl sanctions law that critics say allowed Chinese producers and complicit officials to escape designation, and adding congressional oversight constraints to the President's broad emergency economic powers when invoked to fight international drug trafficking.
What this bill would do
What it would do
The bill would amend the Fentanyl Sanctions Act to broaden the definition of "foreign opioid trafficker" to explicitly cover two new categories: Chinese entities that produce, distribute, or finance synthetic opioids or precursor chemicals and fail to implement know-your-customer procedures or cooperate with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts; and senior Chinese government officials who have regulatory or law enforcement responsibilities over such entities and aid opioid trafficking, including through intentional inaction. It would also direct the President to assess whether specific Chinese agency heads qualify as foreign opioid traffickers, and extend through a 10-year window the annual reporting requirement to Congress on identified traffickers and sanctions imposed — a requirement the bill notes expired in December 2024.
Separately, the bill would amend the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) — the law authorizing the President to restrict economic transactions during declared national emergencies — to require the President, when invoking IEEPA during a drug trafficking emergency, to annually evaluate effectiveness and consult public and private stakeholders, and to include a costs-and-benefits discussion in any regulations issued. Importation of goods is explicitly carved out from the new sanctions authority.
Key provisions
- 1Would expand the Fentanyl Sanctions Act definition of 'foreign opioid trafficker' to include Chinese entities that produce or finance synthetic opioids and fail to implement know-your-customer procedures or cooperate with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts.
- 2Would include senior Chinese government officials who aid opioid trafficking — including through intentional inaction — in the definition of 'foreign opioid trafficker,' making them subject to mandatory sanctions.
- 3Would direct the President to assess whether the heads of four named Chinese government agencies qualify as foreign opioid traffickers and report findings to Congress.
- 4Would extend the annual congressional reporting requirement on identified foreign opioid traffickers from 5 years to 10 years, reviving an obligation that had expired in December 2024.
- 5Would require the President to transmit annual written evaluations to designated congressional committees on the effectiveness of IEEPA authority exercised during an active drug trafficking national emergency.
- 6Would require the President to include a cost-benefit analysis, resolution criteria, and termination plan in any IEEPA regulations issued during a drug trafficking national emergency.
- 7Would exempt importation of goods from all sanctions authority established under the bill.
Who would be affected
Chinese companies that produce or sell synthetic opioids and precursor chemicals, and senior Chinese government officials with relevant regulatory or enforcement duties, who could face mandatory U.S. sanctions. The U.S. President and executive branch agencies responsible for IEEPA implementation and sanctions designations would face new evaluation and disclosure requirements. Congressional committees receive the new annual evaluations.
Why it matters
Chinese entities and officials not previously reachable under the Fentanyl Sanctions Act's existing definition could be subject to mandatory U.S. sanctions — freezing assets and cutting off access to the U.S. financial system. The IEEPA amendments would constrain executive flexibility by requiring cost-benefit justification and effectiveness reviews whenever that sweeping emergency trade authority is used to address drug trafficking, adding a layer of congressional oversight to a power that has historically been broadly exercised.
What would change
Changes to existing law
Amends Fentanyl Sanctions Act, 21 U.S.C. § 2302(5) (Sec. 3(a))
Expands the definition of 'foreign opioid trafficker' to include Chinese entities failing to prevent opioid trafficking and Chinese officials who aid trafficking through intentional inaction.
Amends Fentanyl Sanctions Act, 21 U.S.C. § 2311 (Sec. 3(b))
Requires the President to assess specific Chinese agency heads as potential designees; extends the annual reporting window from 5 years to 10 years.
Amends International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Sec. 4(a))
Adds a requirement for annual written evaluations to Congress on the effectiveness of IEEPA authority exercised during an active drug trafficking national emergency.
Amends International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1703 (Sec. 4(b))
Replaces references to 'the Congress' with 'the appropriate congressional committees,' tightening consultation and reporting recipients.
Amends International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1704 (Sec. 4(b))
Requires cost-benefit analysis, resolution criteria, and termination plans in IEEPA regulations issued during a drug trafficking national emergency.
Agencies directed to act
Funding and costs
Congressional Budget Office estimate
CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 747 would reduce deficits by insignificant amounts (less than $500,000 in any single year) over the 2025–2035 period, with no significant effect on the federal budget.
CBO estimates that H.R. 747 would have insignificant effects on both direct spending (mandatory outlays) and revenues over the 2025–2035 period, with any net deficit reduction falling below $500,000 in each year. The bill would expand the Administration's authority to sanction Chinese entities and officials involved in opioid trafficking, but CBO expects only a small number of additional people or entities would be affected, resulting in trivial changes to visa fee revenues and federal benefit spending. Administrative costs for required reporting to Congress are estimated at less than $500,000 over the 2025–2030 period, subject to appropriations. The bill imposes a private-sector mandate — requiring U.S. entities such as banks to monitor and block transactions involving newly sanctioned parties — but CBO estimates the cost of that mandate would fall well below UMRA's annual threshold of $206 million; it contains no intergovernmental mandates.
How implementation would work
Under the Fentanyl Sanctions Act, the President is already required to impose certain sanctions once an entity is designated a foreign opioid trafficker; the bill expands the pool of designable parties and directs the President to investigate specific Chinese agency heads. The annual report to Congress on traffickers and sanctions — lapsed since December 2024 — would be revived and extended. For IEEPA, the President must transmit periodic written evaluations to six named congressional committees at least annually while a qualifying drug trafficking emergency is active, and must embed a costs-and-benefits analysis, resolution criteria, and a termination plan into any regulations issued under that emergency authority.
Legislative status & sources
Latest action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Official CRS summary
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This bill subjects certain Chinese entities and government officials to potential sanctions related to opioid trafficking and requires the President to conduct certain preliminary analyses before regulating economic transactions in the event of a national emergency related to international drug trafficking.
Specifically, for the purposes of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act, the bill changes the definition of foreign opioid trafficker to specify that the term includes (1) Chinese entities involved in the production or sale of synthetic opioids or related pharmaceutical ingredients that fail to take steps to detect or prevent opioid trafficking; and (2) certain senior Chinese government officials that aid and abet opioid trafficking, including through intentional inaction. Under current law, the President must impose certain sanctions on individuals and entities identified as foreign opioid traffickers.
Further, the bill extends through 2029 an existing requirement that the President report to Congress annually on identified foreign opioid traffickers and any sanctions imposed on them. (This requirement expired in December 2024.)
The bill also requires the President to take additional steps in issuing regulations under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) pursuant to a declared national emergency related to international drug trafficking. (IEEPA authorizes the President to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national emergency.) Under the bill, the President must evaluate the costs and benefits of issuing economic regulations for the purpose of resolving the drug trafficking emergency and publish a discussion of such costs and benefits.
Legislative subjects
Asia; China; Civil actions and liability; Congressional oversight; Drug trafficking and controlled substances; International Affairs; Presidents and presidential powers, Vice Presidents; Sanctions; Smuggling and trafficking
Committee report
H. Rept. 119-19