Chinese Currency Accountability Act of 2025

The bill would direct the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the U.S. Governor of, and the U.S. Executive Director at, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to vote against any increase in the weight of China's currency — the renminbi — in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, which is used to determine the value of the IMF's international reserve asset. The instruction to oppose would remain in effect unless Treasury first submits a written certification to two congressional committees confirming that: China complies with its Article VIII obligations under the IMF's founding agreement; China has not been found to have manipulated its currency in the preceding 12 months; and China adheres to the Paris Club debt rules and the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits.

The bill would sunset automatically 10 years after enactment, at which point the requirement would lose all force and effect. It does not appropriate funds, and it does not itself change China's current SDR weighting — it constrains only how U.S. officials may vote on any future proposed increase.

The Department of the Treasury and the U.S. officials it appoints to represent the United States at the IMF — the U.S. Governor and U.S. Executive Director — who would be directly instructed by the bill. The House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs would receive Treasury's certification reports. China's access to a larger SDR weighting would be indirectly affected by the U.S. vote.

If enacted, the bill would give Congress structured leverage over U.S. IMF voting on Chinese currency influence, tying any American support for renminbi expansion to documented compliance with currency and trade norms. It would also create a reporting obligation that keeps Congress informed of Treasury's assessments of China's economic conduct before any such vote occurs.

Treasury would monitor China's compliance with three sets of standards — IMF Article VIII obligations, the currency-manipulation reports required under existing trade law, and Paris Club and OECD Arrangement adherence. Before the U.S. could support any SDR weight increase for the renminbi, Treasury would have to prepare and transmit a written certification to the relevant House and Senate committees. There is no rulemaking requirement; the mechanism is a reporting-and-certification trigger. The provision expires automatically 10 years after enactment with no agency action required.